One year after Gezi: After all this, how does AKP maintain its power?

In June 2013, millions all around Turkey marched against the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government, confronting brutal police violence and risking their lives. Western media suddenly changed its discourse; “mild Islamism” disappeared to give way to “authoritarianism”. In December 2013, a huge corruption scandal involving several ministers including the prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan broke off. At the same time, some dozen deputies of AKP who belong to the Gülen movement (an international, Islamic-fundamentalist, mafia organization that functions through deep state connections, until recently in coalition with Erdoğan and unofficially taking part in the government) resigned. It seemed like the ruling class coalition was falling apart¹, as European and American representatives of imperialism started to slowly withdraw their support from the government. Then came the unbelievably corrupted local elections in March², the Mayday protests with the by-now-usual police violence, and finally the outrageous mine explosion in Soma with at least 300 deaths.

During these political thunderstorms and hurricanes, Erdoğan made a propaganda campaign with posters of himself with the caption “Strong Will” in all metros, billboards, bus stops and anywhere one could imagine. It was as if he was personally fighting against all the conspiracies against him. The peak of this was reached when he literally punched a protester in Soma: As anywhere else in the world in the good old days, you'd expect citizens to try to hit ministers as a form of protest; in his case, he was protesting the people (o povo / el pueblo) with full indignation – mind you, this was in Soma after the mine explosion due to lack of safety measures and when some 700 people were still missing.

Now, the question is: How does he maintain his power (by now, AKP is identical to Erdoğan's personality) in this turmoil? How is it that he, with his “strong will”, never seems to doubt that he might be doing some mistakes?

This question needs a two-sided answer: 1) Why does imperialism tolerate such a confused situation in the only NATO country in Middle East? Why doesn't the US “bring democracy” to Turkey? 2) If a huge portion of Turkish society is outraged about the AKP government, how can Erdoğan remain in power without sufficient consent from the population?

1. Imperialism and Tayyip: The rather bearable lightness of lack of alternatives.

§1. Erdoğan is arguably the most successful leader ever in Turkish history. In his reign since 2002, he successfully mediated between the interests of imperialism and his own political economic goals. While passing all the imposed EU reforms on free trade, he managed to consolidate all fractions of national bourgeoisie (including the complete destruction of a liberal political party that had 9% of the votes in 2002 elections). During the economic crisis, he slalomed between NATO interests and his own medium-scale imperialist plans in Middle East, and centralized all state apparatus in his personality in such a way that “order” could not be obtained if he were taken out of the equation.

§2. Given this crucial role, there is also a lesson learned by imperialism since Bush regime: If you don't have your alternative to impose, “leaving things messy” may be quite complicated. (see Iraq and Afghanistan) Especially in the presence of popular dissent, the political instability resulting from a government substitution by imperialism may be messier than ever. (see Egypt and Libya) Thus, using more civilized methods such as providing armaments to opposition forces (Syria), financing existing bourgeois movements that can attract some popular support (Venezuela), and supporting and training militia against the government (Ukraine) seems to be the Democrat method of imperialism.

Add to this the fact that Turkey is a NATO country, with military bases near Syria and Iran that require political stability in case of an international political crisis in the Middle East.

§3. Given this brand new, Nobel Peace Prize winner approach, all imperialist agencies (in cooperation with the biggest industrialists in Turkey as well as the Gülen movement) tried to come up with an alternative to Erdoğan. However, as explained in §1, this turned out to be a difficult task.

§4. This lack of alternatives was hardened by the strong anti-capitalist tendency of the June uprising. It was nearly impossible to canalize the anger of the protesters to an existing “milder” bourgeois alternative.

2. The People and Erdoğan: This is what fascism looks like.

§1. In the first years of his reign, Erdoğan played the game with the rules. He modified, reinterpreted and manipulated already existing laws to suppress any possible opposition from other bourgeois fractions. He monopolized almost all media (some %85 is now parroting government propaganda), assigned his adherents to university administrations, and reallocated almost all high-ranking state officials. When this was done, he introduced a constitutional reform as his “knock-out” punch to the separation of powers: From that moment on, all juridical positions would be assigned almost directly by the government.

§2. As was revealed with the leaked phone call recordings, while seizing control of the state apparatus he coherently chose a certain fraction of bourgeoisie over the rest, several times against the interest of the big capital.

§3. Then, when the June uprising came, Erdoğan was fully aware that he was fighting all alone against the masses, that imperialist powers would need time to introduce an alternative, and that if he silents the protests as fast as possible he could re-consolidate his power.

From the June uprising onwards, politics has become a struggle for survival for Erdoğan. Accordingly, he changed gears and declared war against anyone who might have a reason to raise doubts about his leadership.

By now, police does not hesitate to use real bullets when attacking a protest (a recent such occasion caused the murder of two people in Istanbul) while Erdoğan stated that regular and normal police practices were being exaggerated by “some media”.

§4. This “change of gears” had a two-fold effect: While trying to demonize and criminalize the protesters (or, any kind of opposition for that matter), Erdoğan also marginalized himself. He put himself versus any protest, be a radical revolutionary action or a peaceful democratic demand. He defined all opposition as an extremist, thereby pushing himself to the other extreme.

All of a sudden, common practices like male and female students sharing flats became immoral acts, student protests became atheist and/or Jewish conspiracies (which in AKP language means “the worst possible thing ever”), Twitter and Youtube were categorized as means of sinful acts (and therefore got banned), and the mine blast in Soma became a huge international conspiracy against the government.

AKP got smaller and smaller, while maintaining its power in the lack of imperialist or popular alternatives.

§5. In addition, Erdoğan realized that the June protests created huge opportunities of dialogue in different sections of the opposition. An incredible convergence of concerns occurred in the Gezi Park occupation: From privatizations to domestic violence, from lack of LGBT rights to ecological destruction, from labor rights violations to nationalism, all protesters discovered that there was something common in their sufferings: AKP policies and neoliberalism.

Feeling confident that imperialism is doomed to his reign due to lack of alternatives, Erdoğan wisely observed that there is nothing more dangerous for his government (and in fact, for all his political career) than this kind of convergence in the opposition. This had to be stopped. More advanced water cannons had to be bought, and they were. All police department had to be restructured to comply with his personal orders, and it was. Any type of protest had to be oppressed immediately, and they are.

3. To conclude

On the one hand, the convergence among June protesters seems to continue, as seen in the funeral of Berkin Elvan, the mobilization against the Twitter ban, and the protests following the Soma massacre.

On the other hand, this convergence in mentalities has not yet found its concrete form in active political convergence and ideological coherency.

When people come together, they make an arithmetic sum, and it is another thing to transform this into a vectorial sum that can exercise a force to make a change. And this is indeed the – very difficult – task in front of all political movements in Turkey.

***

[This essay was written for ATTAC Portugal. The Portuguese version was published here on June 9th, 2014.]

1“The Political Crisis in Turkey” - Mehmet Baki Deniz, Sinan Eden. https://network23.org/outforbeyond/2014/01/08/the-political-crisis-in-turkey-mehmet-baki-deniz-sinan-eden/

2 “Turquie: Un pas de plus en dehors de la démocratie” - Sinan Eden (Propos recueillis par M. Colloghan), Rouge & Vert, no 377, Avril 2014, 12-13. http://www.alternatifs.org/spip/IMG/pdf/rouge_vert377-2.pdf

The English version of the same interview can be found at http://pretendexistent.blogspot.pt/2014/05/turkey-one-more-step-away-from-democracy.html

Günde Sadece Bir Liraya Ahlaklı Bir İnsan Olma Fırsatı

Televizyonda bir kutup ayısı, kredi kartı faturanı internetten alırsan iklim değişimini durdurmaya katkı koyacağını söylüyor. Devasa bir reklam panosu, Türkiye'nin çöl olmaması için bir vakfa bilmem kaç lira para yatırmanı öğütlüyor. Kahveci, 'adil ticaret' uyguladığı için daha yüksek fiyatla satış yapıyor. Süpermarkette diğer her şeyden ayrı bir reyonda organik sertifikalı gıdalar, diğerlerinden birkaç kat pahalıya satılıyor.

Satın almamız söyleniyor.

“İyi olma”yı satıyorlar.

“Daha iyi bir dünya”yı satıyorlar.

Üstelik bu gittikçe kronik bir hal alıyor. Van'a bağış gönderince içi rahatlayan insan var. Uçak bileti alırken opsiyonel ekstra ücreti ödeyerek doğaya verdiği zararı telafi ettiğini sanan insan var. Türkiye'de erozyonu yılda 20 TL ödeyerek önleyebileceğini düşünen çevreci var. Şu değil o kahveyi içip üç lira fazla ödeyince daha adil bir ticarete katkı koyduğunu düşünen, hatta aynı kahveyi almayan yanındaki arkadaşını duyarsızlıkla eleştiren öğrenci var.

Çünkü formül belli: Daha iyi bir dünya, siyasi değil, ticari bir tercihtir. Dünyadaki adaletsizlikler, acılar, felaketler, birtakım şeylere eskisinden daha fazla ödersek önlenebilir. İnsan politik bir canlı değildir. İnsan ticari bir canlıdır. İnsanın tek toplumsal faaliyeti, tüketici kimliğiyle gerçekleşir.

Neoliberalizmin ahlakı budur. Kapitalizmin kültürü budur.

Kapitalizm, nesneleri göremez. Nesneleri paraya ve metaya çevirir; ve ancak parayı ve metaları görebilir.

Bu yüzden mesela küresel iklim değişiminin etkilerinin ayrıntılı bir bütçesi vardır. Çünkü kapitalizm için haftalarca süren bir tayfunda tüm yakınlarını, evlerini, tarlalarını kaybeden yüz binlerce insan yoktur; olsa olsa ortadan kalkan gayri mülklerin, tamir edilmesi gereken altyapının ve satın alma gücü ortadan kalkan tüketicilerin ekonomik maliyeti vardır.

Ya da mesela dünyada açlığı bitirmenin kaç paraya mal olacağı en ince detaylarına kadar hesaplanmıştır. Ne sömürgecilik, ne petrol rafineleri sebebiyle yaşam olanaklarından edilen Afrikalılar, ne emperyalizm, ne de şu ya da bu sebeple yurtlarından edilip kentlerin çeperlerine doluşan yoksullar vardır. Kapitalizm için, x miktarda karbonhidrat, y miktarda protein, z miktarda elektrik satın alamayan bireyler vardır. Ve bu bireylerin bu x, y, z miktarlarında mevzu bahis şeyleri alması için gereken yegane şey, bizim alışveriş merkezindeki o kutuya elimizdeki bozuklukları atmamızdır.

Çünkü kapitalizm için tek değer, metaların değişim değeridir; tek ahlak, piyasanın ahlakıdır.

Böylece, kapitalizmin insanı, kendini yalnızca ve sadece “ödeme yaparak” ifade eder. Kapitalizm bundan başka bir seçeneği anlayamaz.

Demek ki Gezi ayaklanması olsa olsa faizlerin yükselmesini isteyen bir dış mihrakın işi olabilir. Demek ki hidroelektrik santral inşaatını protesto eden köylüler ülkenin kötülüğünü istiyor olmalıdır.

Bu satırlar yazılırken Brezilya'da Dünya Kupası oynanıyor. Evlerinden (çoğunlukla silah zoruyla) çıkarılan 250 bin kişi ve onlarla dayanışan daha da fazlası, polisin gerçek mermi dahi kullandığı protestolarda hakkını arıyor. Futbol hayranlığıyla bilinen Brezilyalılar, sosyal yatırımlar yerine stadyumlara ayrılan bütçeyi, kendilerine hiçbir şey danışmadan proje yazan sonra da günün birinde kapısını çalıp “Evinizi terk etmeniz gerekiyor, bu binalar yıkılacak.” diyen belediyeyi sorguluyor, eleştiriyor. Oysa karşılarındaki muhattap, onların söylediklerini anlamıyor bile: “Piyasa karar verdi. Burada sizlerin değil zenginlerin yaşaması gerekiyor.”

Anlamıyor derken; gerçekten, tüm boyutlarıyla, bütün açılardan, olayı kavramsallaştıramadığını kast ediyorum. Parasal olarak ifade edilmeyen bir sorun veya çözümü bilişsel olarak anlamlandıramadığını söylüyorum.

Metaların dünyası, insanların cehennemidir. Kapitalizmin kurduğu “ulusal zenginlik ile halkın yoksulluğu arasındaki özdeşlik”¹ yerine özgür insanların dünyasını inşa etmek isteyenler ise, metaların insanlar aracılığıyla ilişkileri yerine gerçek insanlar arasında gerçek ilişkiler kurulan alternatifler düşünmeye çoktan başladı bile: takas pazarları, işgal evleri, komünal yaşam deneyimleri, özgür yazılım, kolektif oluşturulan internet ansiklopedileri ve daha niceleri.

1Karl Marx, Kapital, 1. Cilt, 27. Bölüm.

[Bu yazı, Özgür Gençlik dergisinin Temmuz-Ağustos 2014 tarihli 14. sayısında yayınlandı.]

Kısa Devre Haberler

Başbakan,
dün,
bir cumhurbaşkanının nasıl olması gerektiğini açıkladı.

İçişleri Başbakanı,
geçen sene Haziran ayında,
polise saldır emrini verdi.

Dışişleri Başbakanı,
Suriye politikası hakkındaki görüşlerini
açıkladı.

Çevre Başbakanı,
nükleer santral karşıtlarını,
ülkenin kalkınmasına engel olmakla
suçladı.

Başişleri Dışbakanı,
İsviçre'de
bir dağın tepesinde,
İsrail cumhurbaşkanına
kafa tuttu.

Cumhurişleri İçbakanı,
8 milyon eylemciyi
faiz lobicisi
ilan etti.

Aileden Başsorumlu Devlet Başbakanı,
kadınla erkeğin eşit olmadığını
bildirdi.

Cumhurbaşbakanı,
gönlünde Başkanlık sistemi olduğunu
ifade etti.

Başcumhurbakanı,
sporcunun dövmelerini
acımasızca
eleştirdi.

Kültür Başbakanı,
bir heykeli ucube olarak niteleyince,
Belediye Başbakanı'nın kararıyla,
koca heykel
yerinden söküldü.

Başçevre Bakanı,
çevrecinin daniskası olduğunu
belirtti.

Dış Baş İşleri Bakanı,
IŞİD'in kaçırdığı diplomatların
keyiflerinin yerinde olduğunu
belirtti.

Baş İşleri İç Başbakanı,
Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimleri için
adaylığını açıkladı.

Baştan Sorumlu Devlet Cumhuru Bakanı
'nın kuzeni
RTE Üniversitesi rektörlüğüne
atandı.

Sorumludan Baş Cumhurişleri Bakanı,
Balyoz sanıklarının tahliyesiyle ilgili
"teşekkür bile beklemiyoruz"
dedi.

Baştan Başsorumlu Başdevlet Başcumhurbaşbakanı,
tüm ailesini etrafına toplayıp
bir balkona çıktı
ve seçim zaferini açıkladı.

Haberleri dinlediniz.

Hayırlı akşamlar.

All the garbage we will never see again

Turkey: One More Step Away From Democracy

Note: This interview was originally published in French in Rouge&Vert No.377.

S.E. is a member of the RAGA network, whose international meeting Les Alternatifs co-organized. S. was involved in the Gezi struggle. He offers his analysis of the Turkish municipal elections. A very pessimistic vision. He admits: While his characterization of the regime's evolution seems to be broadly shared by the Turkish left, it does not appear to be stated in any official position of the organization. As if the Turkish left feared to formulate what he sees; that Turkey not be a parliamentary democracy anymore.

Rouge&Vert: Do the results of Turkish elections draw away big changes in the political scene?

S.E. : In 2011, Selda Canan and I collaborated in an article on the general election results in Turkey: “Erdoğan did not let anyone else interfere with his own election campaign. No one saw any candidate of AKP during the campaign. From east to west, from north to south, from TV channels to newspapers, it was only Erdoğan himself who was running the election campaign of AKP. … This phenomenon will probably continue in larger scales while Erdoğan centralizes all the political power in his person.” (Rouge&Vert No. 328, page 10)

Our prediction came true. It is well necessary to understand it before leaning over the official results of these elections: They did not take place years the frame of a classical representative democracy but in a country toppling over towards a regime of fascist nature.

R&V: Talking of “fascism”, it's a bit too strong, isn't it?

S.E.: And so I assert: If one considers what a fascist regime could possibly be in a NATO country under American control, there is plenty of evidence that Turkey corresponds to this definition:

• The state cannot be separated from the government and the government cannot be separated from its leader.
• All check-and-balance mechanisms of the regime are annulled (including laws and constitution).
• The power rules by “at the moment” orders.
• All opposition is criminalized.
• The Prime Minister allocates and reallocates high ranking bureaucrats according to his wish.
• At least 80% of media is controlled by the government.

• Erdoğan personally phones TV channels to change contents of news.
• Twitter and Youtube were banned during the elections.

R&V: This does not change the fact that AKP earned elections.

S.E: When I started by analysis of the election results as those in a fascistic state, I mean that there is no correlation between the votes and the official results.

So:

• During the counting of votes, there were power cuts in 40 provinces ! Thousands of reports came from all over the country, proving frauds and miscounts.
• There is abunant evidence that the opposition party candidate won in Ankara, while official results declare AKP victorous. The election board overruled all complaints and objections. There is a good amount of evidence for the same situation in Istanbul and several other big cities.
• In Agri, the Kurdish party BDP won by a slight difference with AKP. AKP objected. The election board agreed to make a recount. BDP won. AKP objected again. The board agreed to make a recount. BDP won. AKP objected again. The board agreed to make a recount. BDP won. … For exactly 15 times ! 15 times, AKP acquired the re-count of the votes, and finally they decided to cancel the elections, and repeat it in June!
• In the meanwhile, Erdogan gave a speech with his family (in a balcony!) before the counting finished. He declared that they are victorious.
• Erdoğan made a speech (appearing with family on a balcony!) to announce his victory, much before the official declaration of the results.

Once again: We are talking about a country, where a single person controls the state apparatus – as much as it is theoretically allowed in a NATO country between Middle East, EU and Russia.

Erdoğan is still in power, not because the people consented to his power. Erdogan is in power, because imperialism has been trying since the June Uprising to find an alternative, and they couldn't... yet.

We should intensify the struggle so that Erdoğan falls, not because imperialism finds an alternative, but because the people continue the impressive revolt initiated last summer in Gezi Park.

R&V: Precisely: Is there any electoral result of the Gezi movement?

S.E.: No, as Gezi did not enter into elections. But also yes, because it weakened AKP, which lost its hegemony and hence could not afford to have free elections. Gezi shifted up the gears of class struggle.

AKP responded by open fascism (instead of the so-called “Mild Islamism” rhetorics... Does anyone even remember that?). It is now our turn to catch up and fight back.

R&V: As for official results, in concrete terms?

S.E.: To understand well its validity, it is necessary to compare the following images. Figure 1 gives official results and Figure 2 gives the list of power cuts during the counting of the votes. There is also this amazing Figure 3, where you can see Turkish citizens securing the votes in the middle of "power cuts" and “server problems” against fraud.

Figure 1: Official results

Figure 2: Power cuts during the counting of votes

Figure 3: Citizens trying to secure the votes, for 2 days.

R&V: How can you explain that the scandals of the government members did not affect the results for AKP?

S.E.: It is simply that the majority of the media is pro-AKP, and they either completely ignore or underrate these affairs. AKP voters have no access to this information.

R&V: What about the left and the Kurdish results ?

S.E.: Left parties did not increase their votes. Leftist voters rather chose to have a “useful vote” for the main opposition party, to beat AKP. On paper, an allied opposition does get higher results than AKP. This is certain. However, it seems that people did not realize that a fascist government cannot be overthrown via electoral alliances, or transitional methods for that matter.

Interview by M. Colloghan