Showing posts with label Philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philosophy. Show all posts

Stalin ve Barış Süreci



§1. Tarihsel analizin bilimsel yöntemi şudur: Bir olay veya düşünce, bugünden geçmişe bakarak, retrospektif olarak değerlendirilmez. Olayın/düşüncenin var olduğu koşullar altında, geçmişten bugüne doğru, yani ileriye doğru bakarak değerlendirilir.

§2. Kendimizi 1930'ların sonlarında Sovyetler Birliği'nde hayal edelim. Stalin iktidarda. Naziler güçleniyor ve emperyalist güçlerin bununla bir sorunu varmış gibi görünmüyor. Bilakis, faşizme yol veriyorlar.

§3. Stalin, Hitler'le saldırmazlık anlaşması imzalıyor. Böylece iki kamp ortaya çıkıyor.

§4. Süreççi kamp: “Naziler'in bize saldıracağını biliyoruz, ama zaman kazanmamız lazım. Acilen silah sanayinde bir atılım yapmamız ve nitelikli bir ordu kurmamız lazım (bunun için eski çarist kadroları bile kabul edebiliriz). Kazanacağımız her saniye değerlidir. Böylece Naziler saldırdığında onları alt edebileceğiz ve faşizmi dünya tarihinden sileceğiz!”

§5. Devrimci kamp: “Sınıf düşmanıyla anlaşma mı yapılırmış? Hele ki Naziler'le! Bu sosyalizme ihanettir. Naziler'e karşı savaşmalıyız, faşizmle barış olmaz. Üstelik enayilik ediyorlar: Şimdi saldırmazsak Naziler Kıta Avrupası'nı ele geçirecekler, o bölgenin sanayisine el koyacaklar, böylece askeri açıdan bizden çok daha güçlü hale gelecekler. İşte asıl o zaman sosyalizm yenilecek. Ve bunun sorumlusu da süreççiler olacak!”

§6. Bir parantez açalım. Süreççi kamp resmi olarak asla §4'teki gibi laflar etmiyor. Aksine: Dönemin Pravda'sı “Rus ulusal gururundan” bahsediyor. Eisenstein bile “ezeli ve ebedi Rus imparatorluğunu” öven filmler çekmeye başlıyor. §4'te (ve §7'de) yazılanlar, Stalinciler'in iyimser niyet okumasıyla diğer kadroları ikna etmekte kullandıkları argümanın özeti. Parantezi kapatalım.

§7. Süreççi kamp: “Devrimci kamp hayalcilik ediyor. Şu anda ne savaşacak enerjimiz var, ne de buna müsaade eden bir uluslararası konjonktür. Yıllardır savaşıp duruyoruz zaten. Eğer şimdi biraz soluklanmazsak ve hazırlık yapmazsak, faşistleri yenmemiz imkansız.”

§8. Devrimci kamp: “Süreççiler hayal görüyor olmalı. Naziler'in bu saldırmazlığa uymayacağı gün gibi açık. Bunu sırf biz demiyoruz. İngiltere'de, ABD'de, tüm analistler bunun böyle olacağını, Naziler'in ilk fırsatta sosyalizme saldıracağını söylüyorlar. Zaten o yüzden ticari anlaşmalar yapıyorlar Almanya'yla. Görmüyor musunuz? Emperyalizm ellerini ovuşturuyor ve Naziler'in sırtını sıvazlıyor. Bizse onlara güçlenme fırsatı veriyoruz. Olacak iş mi?!”

§9. Yıl 1940. Hala Sovyetler Birliği'ndeyiz. Hummalı bir çalışmayla hazırlıklar sürüyor. Hitler Norveç ve Fransa'yı ele geçiriyor, İtalya ile ittifak kuruyor. Devrimci kamp bas bas bağırıyor.

§10. Yıl 1941. Hala Sovyetler Birliği'ndeyiz. Hummalı bir çalışmayla hazırlıklar sürüyor. Hitler yüzünü doğuya çeviriyor. Balkanlar'ı ve Yunanistan'ı alıyor. Devrimci kamp bas bas bağırıyor. Ve Haziran'ın sonunda Sovyetler Birliği'ne saldırıyor! Sadece iki ayda Moskova'ya kadar ulaşıyor faşizmin orduları.

§11. Şimdi bir durup düşünelim. Ya Sovyetler Birliği yenilseydi? Herkes böyle olmasını bekliyordu. Tüm askeri analistlerin hesapları bunu gösteriyordu. Hitler, tüm Avrupa'nın en modern ordusunu kurmuştu. Üstelik şimdi yanında İtalya, Romanya ve Finlandiya da vardı. Daha 25 yıl öncesine kadar yüzde 80'i köylü olan bir toplumun böyle bir güce karşı ne şansı vardı ki?

§12. Ama öyle olmadı. Sovyetler Birliği faşizmi yendi. Yenemeyebilirdi. Yenememesi çok büyük bir ihtimaldi. Ama yendi. Stalinciler, “süreççi kamp”, haklı çıktı. “Devrimci kamp” Troçkici oldu, sol sapma sayıldı, hayalciliği “ispat edildi.”

§13. Kimse, Sovyetler Birliği'nin bu zaferinde ideolojik tavizlerin ve askeri becerilerin katkısını asla yadsıyamadı. Hatta Stalinciler Sovyetler Birliği'nin bu dönemdeki tüm kötülüklerini haklı çıkarmaya başladılar: “Öyle diyorsun ama bak bunlar sayesinde faşizmi yendik.” (örn. Kemal Okuyan, “Stalin'i Anlamak”) Yani Stalinciler saldırmazlık anlaşmasını vb. bugünden geçmişe doğru bakarak, retrospektif olarak haklı çıkardılar.

§14. Şimdi günümüze gelelim ve paralel bir öykü yazalım. (§2-§10 arasın paragrafları baştan yazıyorum. Satır satır takip edilebilir.)

2010'lu yıllardayız. Kürdistan'dayız. PKK, BDP/DBP, HDK, HDP, DTK, YPG, PYD ve alfabedeki herhangi üç harfin yan yana getirilmesiyle oluşturulan bilumum örgüt var. Türkiye'de de AKP iktidarda ve Kürdistan için emperyalizmden vize almışa benziyor. Barış süreci başlıyor. Ve iki kamp ortaya çıkıyor. “Süreççi kamp” ve “sosyalizmci kamp”.

Bu iki kampın argümanlarını gayet iyi biliyoruz. Yine de kabaca özetleyelim:

Süreççi: Kürt halkı çok yoruldu ve şu anda AKP'ye karşı savaşan başka özne yok Türkiye'de.
Sosyalizmci: AKP ile, faşizmle barış yapılamaz. AKP Kürt hareketini tasfiye edecek.
Süreççi: Türkiye'de herhangi bir geçici/kalıcı ateşkes, Rojava'da devrimci fırsatlar yaratıyor.
Sosyalizmci: AKP bir yandan barış diyor, bir yandan KCK tutuklamaları devam ediyor. AKP'nin ikiyüzlü olduğunu görmüyor musunuz?

Hayat devam ediyor. AKP anayasayı değiştiriyor. Hukuk devletinin kalıntıları da ortadan kaldırılıyor. Sosyalizmci kamp bas bas bağırıyor. Hayat devam ediyor. AKP Suriye'de El Nusra'yı destekliyor. Sosyalizmci kamp bas bas bağırıyor.

§15. Hem Kürt hareketi hem de Stalin için geçerli olan bir polemik var: “Süreççi kamp” gerçekten manevra mı yapıyor, yoksa kendi çıkarları için devrimci idealleri mi satıyor? “Süreççi kamp”ın hakiki ideolojik pozisyonu nedir? Bilmiyoruz. Bilemiyoruz. Zaten de bilinemez. Hayatın ve manevraların örgütleri ve kişileri ne ölçüde ve ne yönde dönüştüreceği, pre-deterministik değildir. (Nitekim, 2. Dünya Savaşı sonunda Sovyetler Birliği'nden geriye kalan şeyin ne kadar “sosyalizm” olduğu daha hala tartışılıyor.)

§16. Tekrar 1939'a gidelim ve ileriye doğru bakalım. Sovyetler Birliği iyi mi yaptı? O gün orada olsak, saldırmazlık anlaşmasını savunur muyduk? Yoksa Troçkicilik mi ederdik? O gün orada olsak, hangi tarafı seçerdik? Hangi tarafı seçmeliydik? Ya Sovyetler Birliği yenilseydi?

§17. Bugüne gelelim ve ileriye doğru bakalım. Ya Kürt hareketi yenilirse? Diyelim 20xy tarihinde kaybettiler. O tarihten, 20xy tarihinden geçmişe, bugüne doğru bakıp - tarihsel analizin metoduna aykırı olarak - kendimizi haklı mı ilan edeceğiz?

Peki ya Kürt hareketi kazanırsa? Meksika'ya mı göç edeceğiz? “Aslında” haklı olduğumuzu, “teorik olarak” “gerçek” marksizmi bizim savunduğumuzu falan dur otur tekrar mı edeceğiz? Onların kazandıkları şeyin işçi sınıfı mücadelesiyle alakası bile olmadığını mı söyleyeceğiz?

§18. Bir süredir şunu fark ediyorum: Bir süredir Sovyetler Birliği'ne bakıp Stalincilik eden kimi düşünürler ve politikacılar, Kürt hareketine karşı Troçkicilik ediyorlar. Yöntem hatası yapıyorlar.

Günde Sadece Bir Liraya Ahlaklı Bir İnsan Olma Fırsatı



Televizyonda bir kutup ayısı, kredi kartı faturanı internetten alırsan iklim değişimini durdurmaya katkı koyacağını söylüyor. Devasa bir reklam panosu, Türkiye'nin çöl olmaması için bir vakfa bilmem kaç lira para yatırmanı öğütlüyor. Kahveci, 'adil ticaret' uyguladığı için daha yüksek fiyatla satış yapıyor. Süpermarkette diğer her şeyden ayrı bir reyonda organik sertifikalı gıdalar, diğerlerinden birkaç kat pahalıya satılıyor.

Satın almamız söyleniyor.

“İyi olma”yı satıyorlar.

“Daha iyi bir dünya”yı satıyorlar.

Üstelik bu gittikçe kronik bir hal alıyor. Van'a bağış gönderince içi rahatlayan insan var. Uçak bileti alırken opsiyonel ekstra ücreti ödeyerek doğaya verdiği zararı telafi ettiğini sanan insan var. Türkiye'de erozyonu yılda 20 TL ödeyerek önleyebileceğini düşünen çevreci var. Şu değil o kahveyi içip üç lira fazla ödeyince daha adil bir ticarete katkı koyduğunu düşünen, hatta aynı kahveyi almayan yanındaki arkadaşını duyarsızlıkla eleştiren öğrenci var.

Çünkü formül belli: Daha iyi bir dünya, siyasi değil, ticari bir tercihtir. Dünyadaki adaletsizlikler, acılar, felaketler, birtakım şeylere eskisinden daha fazla ödersek önlenebilir. İnsan politik bir canlı değildir. İnsan ticari bir canlıdır. İnsanın tek toplumsal faaliyeti, tüketici kimliğiyle gerçekleşir.

Neoliberalizmin ahlakı budur. Kapitalizmin kültürü budur.

Kapitalizm, nesneleri göremez. Nesneleri paraya ve metaya çevirir; ve ancak parayı ve metaları görebilir.

Bu yüzden mesela küresel iklim değişiminin etkilerinin ayrıntılı bir bütçesi vardır. Çünkü kapitalizm için haftalarca süren bir tayfunda tüm yakınlarını, evlerini, tarlalarını kaybeden yüz binlerce insan yoktur; olsa olsa ortadan kalkan gayri mülklerin, tamir edilmesi gereken altyapının ve satın alma gücü ortadan kalkan tüketicilerin ekonomik maliyeti vardır.

Ya da mesela dünyada açlığı bitirmenin kaç paraya mal olacağı en ince detaylarına kadar hesaplanmıştır. Ne sömürgecilik, ne petrol rafineleri sebebiyle yaşam olanaklarından edilen Afrikalılar, ne emperyalizm, ne de şu ya da bu sebeple yurtlarından edilip kentlerin çeperlerine doluşan yoksullar vardır. Kapitalizm için, x miktarda karbonhidrat, y miktarda protein, z miktarda elektrik satın alamayan bireyler vardır. Ve bu bireylerin bu x, y, z miktarlarında mevzu bahis şeyleri alması için gereken yegane şey, bizim alışveriş merkezindeki o kutuya elimizdeki bozuklukları atmamızdır.

Çünkü kapitalizm için tek değer, metaların değişim değeridir; tek ahlak, piyasanın ahlakıdır.

Böylece, kapitalizmin insanı, kendini yalnızca ve sadece “ödeme yaparak” ifade eder. Kapitalizm bundan başka bir seçeneği anlayamaz.

Demek ki Gezi ayaklanması olsa olsa faizlerin yükselmesini isteyen bir dış mihrakın işi olabilir. Demek ki hidroelektrik santral inşaatını protesto eden köylüler ülkenin kötülüğünü istiyor olmalıdır.

Bu satırlar yazılırken Brezilya'da Dünya Kupası oynanıyor. Evlerinden (çoğunlukla silah zoruyla) çıkarılan 250 bin kişi ve onlarla dayanışan daha da fazlası, polisin gerçek mermi dahi kullandığı protestolarda hakkını arıyor. Futbol hayranlığıyla bilinen Brezilyalılar, sosyal yatırımlar yerine stadyumlara ayrılan bütçeyi, kendilerine hiçbir şey danışmadan proje yazan sonra da günün birinde kapısını çalıp “Evinizi terk etmeniz gerekiyor, bu binalar yıkılacak.” diyen belediyeyi sorguluyor, eleştiriyor. Oysa karşılarındaki muhattap, onların söylediklerini anlamıyor bile: “Piyasa karar verdi. Burada sizlerin değil zenginlerin yaşaması gerekiyor.”

Anlamıyor derken; gerçekten, tüm boyutlarıyla, bütün açılardan, olayı kavramsallaştıramadığını kast ediyorum. Parasal olarak ifade edilmeyen bir sorun veya çözümü bilişsel olarak anlamlandıramadığını söylüyorum.

Metaların dünyası, insanların cehennemidir. Kapitalizmin kurduğu “ulusal zenginlik ile halkın yoksulluğu arasındaki özdeşlik”1 yerine özgür insanların dünyasını inşa etmek isteyenler ise, metaların insanlar aracılığıyla ilişkileri yerine gerçek insanlar arasında gerçek ilişkiler kurulan alternatifler düşünmeye çoktan başladı bile: takas pazarları, işgal evleri, komünal yaşam deneyimleri, özgür yazılım, kolektif oluşturulan internet ansiklopedileri ve daha niceleri.


1Karl Marx, Kapital, 1. Cilt, 27. Bölüm.

[Bu yazı, Özgür Gençlik dergisinin Temmuz-Ağustos 2014 tarihli 14. sayısında yayınlandı.]

Ege M. Diren - "Özgürlük"ün özgürlüğü için mücadeleye katkı

Ege M. Diren - "Özgürlük"ün özgürlüğü için mücadeleye katkı
İki örnek üzerinden kısa bir deneme

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Hepimiz 'dişperisi-tanımaz'ız. Birçoğumuz, 'zeus-tanımaz'ız. Çünkü dişperisi ve Zeus'un "var olmadıklarını" anlayabiliyoruz. Tanrıtanımazlar sadece bir adım fazla atıyorlar bu hususta.*

"Özgür" iradesiyle, olmayan bir şeyin olduğuna (ve duruma göre, her şeyi yarattığına, ahlakı yarattığına, bizi cezalandıracağına, bizi ödüllendireceğine, her şeyi bildiğine, her şeye muktedir olduğuna vb) "inanma özgürlüğü" konusundaki sığ tartışmanın sonucu olan "başörtüsüne özgürlük" söyleminin boşluğundan boğulanlara bir nefes geliyor İstanbul dışından. Avrupa'dan devşirilmiş solculuktan başka şeyler de oluyor bu ülkede.

"Munzur özgür akacak" ya da "Dereler gümbür gümbür / Karadeniz özgürdür" sloganlarındaki ortak unsura dikkat edelim. Sonra, bu sloganlarla "Başörtüsüne özgürlük" sloganı arasındaki ayrışmayı fark edelim. Bu sloganların hepsi -çok ilginç bir şekilde- aynı ülkede somutlaşıyor.

"Özgür" akan derelerden bahseden bir topluluktan daha zarif, daha derinlikli bir kitlesel hareket hayal edemiyorum. (Öte yandan; Zeus'a inanma, dişperisine inanma gibi bir "özgürlük"ten bahsetmekten daha boyutsuz bir politika, daha amorf bir felsefe de hayal edemiyorum.)

Bu ekolojist hareketin içinde; en incelikli marksist tartışmaların, en rafine özgürlük felsefesinin sezgileri görülüyor. Bu kitlenin sezgileri, çok daha derinlikli bir politik hareketi, çok daha güçlü bir felsefi poziyonu ima ediyor. Bundan daha büyük umut kaynağı olamayacağını iddia ediyorum.

Tüm sol teorisyenleri, tüm devrimci muhalifleri, tüm aydın demokratları; yukarıda değinilen iki hareket arasındaki tezatı görmeye, kendi duruşlarını sorgulamaya (ve mümkünse, bir süreliğine İngilizce'den ve Fransızca'dan çeviri makale okumamaya) davet ediyorum.

Özgürlük gibi derin bir kavramı; metafizik inançlara özgürlük, homofobiye özgürlük, transfobiye özgürlük, köleliğe özgürlük gibi yabancılaşmayı yeniden ve yeniden üreten kavramlara ulamak; insanlığın bunca felsefi birikimine saygısızlıktır. Hele ki aynı toplum içerisinde, derelerin, denizlerin özgürlüğünü savunacak kadar bütüncül, evrensel, ekolojist bir söylem varken.

Özgürlük mücadelesi pazarda domates seçmeye benzemez, n boyutlu**2 bir tartışmanın sonucudur.
Özgürlük mücadelesi pazarda domates seçmeye benzer, çürükleri alırsanız zehirlenme riskiniz vardır.



* Fikir, Richard Dawkins'ten alıntıdır.
** n herhangi bir doğal sayı olmak üzere

Marx'in hakkini Marx'a vermek, marksistin hakki olmayani marksistten almak

Marx'ın hakkını Marx'a vermek, marksistin hakkı olmayanı marksistten almak
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Herkes Marx okuyabilir. Mesele, kimin Marx'ı daha iyi veya doğru okuduğu değildir.

Marksistler dünyaya bakınca marksist metinleri görürler. Oysa marksist metinlere bakıp dünyayı görmeleri gerekir.

İnsan marksist olduğu için komünist olmaz. İnsan, dünyada çözmek istediği sorunlar gördüğü için komünist olur. Marx, dünyadaki sorunlara dair bir metod ve bir anlayış sunar. Ama marksist, Marx doğru anlayış sundu diye komünist olmaz, dünyayla ilgili bir derdi olduğu için komünist olur.

Marx'ın heteroseksizme değinmemiş oluşu, heteroseksizmin bir sorun olduğu gerçeğini değiştirmez. Sorunlar, marksist metinlerde tanımlanmazlar. Sorunlar, marksist metinlerde irdelenirler. Marksizm, bir tomar kağıtta dünyanın bütün sorunlarını içermez.

Meseleler, marksizmin birer "uygulaması" değildir. Marksizm, meselelere dair bir "soyutlama"dır.

Küresel iklim değişimi Marx'ın metinlerinde incelenmiş değildir. Ama bu, küresel iklim değişimin dünyanın en acil ve öncelikli sorunu olduğu gerçeğini değiştirmez.

Marx, başı sonu belli bir doktrin sunmaz; dünyayı, tarihi anlamak (ve dolayısıyla değiştirmek) için bir yöntem, bir yaklaşım sunar. Bu, marksizmin asıl gücüdür.

Marksistin "birincil derdi" Marx'ı anlamak değildir, dünyayı değiştirmektir. Öte yandan, dünyayı değiştirmek "için" Marx'ı anlamaya çalışır.

İnsanlığın meselelerini tarih içinde algılamaya çalışmak ne kadar doğruysa, ekoloji krizinde sınıfsal bir fırsat görmediği için konuya burun kıvıran marksist de o kadar hatalıdır. Marksist perspektif ne kadar doğruysa, eşcinselliği tedavi edeceğini vaat ederek militan homofobik zırvalar yumurtlamak o kadar insanlık dışıdır.

Amateur Free

Amateur Free
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-Are you free?
+Life is more complicated than philosophy.
-But again, are you free? Or rather, are we free?
+Do you mean there is a correlation between these two?
-Which two?
+My freedom, and ours.
-“You” are part of “us”, isn't it?
+Correct. But “my freedom” may or may not be a part of “our freedom”. Maybe they are even disjoint. Every weekend I play tennis. Will you defend that we played tennis last Saturday?
-Don't change the subject.
+I wasn't changing the subject. I am free. Or even better, I want to be free. Now, do you want to be free?
-I am not sure whether I want to be free or I want us to be free.
+Now you understand what I mean.
-I do. But let me appeal to philosophy.
+Oh, not again.
-Wait. This time it'll work. Watch: I am free. I, as a free individual, want to have a free relationship with you. Once “we” obtain it, this leads to two important conclusions. First, our free relationship verifies my freedom. Second, it destroys my freedom. Now, let's restart the reasoning with different initial values. We have a free relationship. This by definition means that each and every moment I once again choose to be with you. My choice is -by construction- free. So, as long as I am with you, this is and has to be my own decision. Therefore, I get free. Hence the conclusions: My freedom theoretically creates the negation of our free relationship, since it opens up the possibility of ending the free relationship, either completely, or by limiting the freedom. On the other hand, my freedom is the affirmation of our freedom.
+You will never stop abusing ontological arguments to support your emotions, will you?
-Well, I won't, unless they don't work.
+Now, do you want to be free, or do you want us to be free?
-Both, as they are essentially the same. You?
+I'm not sure yet.

Hic kimsenin mi aklina gelmiyor? ya da Inanma ozgurlugu:1 Inanmama ozgurlugu:0

Hiç kimsenin mi aklına gelmiyor? YA DA İnanma özgürlüğü:1 İnanmama özgürlüğü:0
Üniversite öğrencilerinin kampüse ve/veya derslere türban takarak girmelerine, girmelerini engelleyen yasaklara ve kişilere dair o kadar çok şey söylendi ki; insanın aklı almıyor, çok bariz bir anlamı nasıl kimsenin görmediğini.
Laiklik savunucuları ve onların stratejik müteffiklerinin diliyle konu şu kavramlar etrafında konuşuldu[1]: Din istismarı, gericilik, siyasi sembol, halkın inançları üzerinden siyasi rant, dincilik.
Öte yanda ise şöyle kavramlar dolaştı durdu: İnanç özgürlüğü, eğitim hakkı, kişi hak ve hürriyetleri, mağduriyet.
O kadar sıkıldım ki; konuyu politik, sosyolojik, ekonomi politik olarak falan ele alacak değilim. Çok daha genel bir bakış açısıyla[2] ilginç bir noktaya değinmek istiyorum. Bu noktaya da, hakikaten sadece değineceğim, uzun uzadıya argümantasyon yapacak değilim.
Durum garip: Allah diye bir şey, kadınlara, başları açık[3] olarak toplum önüne çıkmayı yasaklıyor. Sonra, bir grup insan[4], onların üniversiteye başları kapalı olarak girmelerini yasaklıyor. Herkes o bir grup insanın yasakçılığından dem vuruyor, ama nedense kimse allahın yasakçılığından bahsetmiyor.
Ortada iki acente var. Biri başı açık ortalıkta gezmeyi, diğeri başı kapalı kamusal alanlara girmeyi yasaklıyor. Gözlemler şöyle:
- O demin bahsettiğim bir grup insan, geri kalan her şey sabit tutulsa bile[5], görece olarak daha az yasakçı bir tutum sergiliyorlar. Mesela onlar, pazara giderken hangi modayı takip etmeniz gerektiğine dair kural koymuyorlar.
- Kategorik olarak, hangi acentenin yasaklarına itaat edilmesi gerektiğine karar verilmiş değil. Daha doğru kelimelerle söylemek gerekirse; o bir grup insana mı yoksa allaha mı tapmak/itaat etmek gerektiğine dair bir öntartışma gerçekleşmiş değil.
- Düşünsel olarak ise, o bir grup insanın yasaklarına itaat etmek görece daha anlamlı görünüyor; zira o insanların var olduklarına dair en azından biraz kanıt var elimizde.
- Daha da genel olarak, o bir grup insanın yasağını eleştirmeye falan çalıştığımızda onlarla oturup tartışma ihtimalimiz sıfırdan büyük[6]. Ama, allahla pazarlığa oturmak, benim anladığım kadarıyla, pek mümkün değil. Yani, o bir grup insanın yasasına neyin saygı duymak pratik olarak daha anlamlı görünüyor.[7]
Türbanla ilgili yasakların ne doğru olduklarını söylüyorum, ne de yanlış olduklarını. Politik tartışmada, en azından bu yazı sınırları içerisinde, taraf almıyorum. Çok basit bir şey söylüyorum aslında: Eğer mevcut koşullar bunlarsa, bireyler, davranışlarından önce, deminden beri söylediklerimi de hesaba katsalar daha sağlıklı bir zeminde tartışırız hangi noktaya ne şekilde ulaşmak istediğimizi.


[1] Kimsenin bu kelimelerin hepsini kullandığını söylemiyorum tabii ki. Sadece; bu cephede genel olarak bu kavramlar aracılığıyla düşünce üretildiğini iddia ediyorum.
[2] Yani demem o ki, politik konjontürden bağımsız olarak.
[3] Kendinize uygun İslami fraksiyona göre bu kavram da değişiyor tabii: Ziynet yerlerinin/süs yerlerinin/ başın/bedenin örtülmesi/gizlenmesi/saklanması ve şimdi aklıma gelmeyen çeşitlemeler var ortalıkta.
[4] Gerçekten bu grubu tam olarak tanımlayacak bir kelime, bir ideoloji yok. Bunu fark etmiş miydiniz?
[5] “bile” kelimesi önemli. Tüm ahlakı değerlendirsek o bir grup insan özgürlük şampiyonu gibi görünür çünkü.
[6] Tamam tamam kabul ediyorum, sıfırdan büyük, ama çok da büyük değil.
[7] “daha anlamlı” görünmesi “saçma” olduğu gerçeğini değiştirmiyor tabii ki.

Mathematics in the Soviet Union: A Political Activity

Mathematics in the Soviet Union: A Political Activity

0. Introduction
Mathematicians of today are considered as academicians who are isolated in their offices working on problems no one will ever to try understand and on subjects no one knows of. Although at first sight this seems to apply to most of the natural sciences and in some cases even to social sciences, undoubtedly mathematics is considered as “the” discipline of working on unnecessary subjects that have nothing to do with real life.
This approach to mathematics and mathematicians is a result of the historical context we live in. An immediate example of a contrary approach would be that of ancient times where mathematics was the essential science for practicalities such as trading, architecture, farming, and military. Even though the connections remained tight, there is almost a consensus both in today’s society and in the academies that the role of mathematics in practical life diminished during professionalisation and specialisation in 19th and 20th centuries.[1]
However, 'historical context’ is not limited to time but is indeed a function of space as well. In this essay, mathematics in the Soviet Union and its relationship with the political atmosphere of the time will be discussed. While the main focus will be on the period 1917-1941, supporting information from different periods will be included as well. As “the importance of Russian and Soviet mathematics is poorly reflected in English-language sources”[2]; some of the examples and quotations will be on science in general and not on mathematics proper. Those examples are included for the purpose of illustrating the general approach to science and scientists in that time.
First, the contrast between the definitions and explanations of mathematics made in Encyclopaedia Britannica and Large Soviet Encyclopaedia, both printed around same years, will be pointed out. Next, a brief summary of the history of tsarist period in Russia and the Soviet Union will be given, mainly concentrating on the approach to science. Then, the politicisation of mathematics will be discussed. This section consists of two parts: First, the environment in which mathematical research was done; and second, the controversies on what mathematics is and what it should be. Lastly, an analysis of the development of mathematics, focusing on the underlying historical influences to it, will be made.
The main argument of this essay is that mathematics is a political activity, and that today’s approach to mathematics as an apolitical activity itself is a highly political stance.

1. What is Mathematics?Two important encyclopaedias were prepared in 1930s; the Encyclopaedia Britannica (hereafter EB) was printed in 1941, and the Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediaa (Large Soviet Encyclopaedia; hereafter BSE) in 1938. The main contrasts between EB and BSE concerning mathematics are “on the most essential questions of mathematics: What are the origins of mathematics? and What is the relationship between mathematics and the real world?”[3] These questions, mainly dealing with the problem of how mathematical developments occur, are answered in completely different manners in the afore mentioned sources.[4]
1.1. Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediaa
The entry “Mathematics” in BSE was written by A.N.Kolmogorov, one of the leading mathematicians of the Moscow school of probability who was also a student of N.N.Luzin. In his article, he “quoted Engel's views on how mathematics was a reflection of material relationships and answered practical needs in its early history, later grew to be a highly abstract field, but never lost its organic tie to material reality.”[5] He asserted that mathematics arose out of “the most elementary needs of economic life.”[6] He also noted that whilst mathematics became more and more abstract, its origins in real life were forgotten by mathematicians; but he reminded them that

“the abstractness of mathematics does not mean its divorce from material reality. In direct connection with the demands of technology and science the fund of knowledge of quantitative relations and spatial forms studied by mathematics constantly grows.”[7]

Kolmogorov's definition is consistent with A.D.Aleksandrov's approach to the relationship between mathematics and dialectics, which will be discussed in section 3.2.2. .
1.2. Encyclopaedia Britannica
On the other hand, in EB, there is a very different approach to mathematics in the articles “Mathematics, Foundations of” by F.P.Ramsey and “Mathematics, Nature of” by A.N.Whitehead. They never referred to practical needs of the humanity, but treated mathematics as a discipline independent of physical reality. Indeed, Ramsey maintained that “as a branch mathematics, geometry has no essential reference to physical space”[8] According to his analysis, the mathematician

“regards geometry as simply tracing the consequences of certain axioms dealing with undefined terms, which are really variables in the ordinary mathematical sense, like x and y. And he demands of his axioms, not that they should be true on some particular physical interpretation of the undefined terms, but merely that should be consistent with one another.”[9]

In addition, one should note that Whitehead asserted that the “act of counting” is “irrelevant to the idea of number.”[10]

Taking these two sources into consideration, it should be observed that, as mentioned in the introduction, the notion of mathematics today as a logical system independent of real life is not intrinsic to the mathematics itself but is a result of the social context in which mathematics is defined.

2. Historical Background
Before opening a discussion on the development of mathematics in the revolutionary period of the Soviet Union, it is essential to recall the history of mathematics and science in that region. Even though it would be useful to consider the early periods of Russian history; namely the Kievan Rus' period from the ninth century A.D. to approximately 1240, the period of Mongol role from 1240 to 1480, and the time of Muscotive primacy from 1480 to 1700; due to space limitations, the focus will be restricted to the Imperial period of Russia, the revolutions in 1917, and the early years of the socialist state.
2.1. The Imperial period of Russia
The Imperial period of Russia is marked by the modernisation efforts started by Peter the Great. In his reign, from 1689 to 1725; in addition to establishing a navigation school, a Naval Academy, an artillery school, an engineering school and a medical school; most important for our study, he initiated the establishment of the Academy of Sciences in St.Petersburg, the foundation of which was finished in 1725, after his death. The founders and early mathematicians of the Academy include Daniel and Nicholas Bernoulli, Jacob Hermann and Leonhard Euler.
The reforms continued during the reigns of Catherine the Great (1762-1796), Alexander I (1801-1825) and Alexander II (1855-1881), while there were repressive periods as well. The Moscow University was founded in 1755. This was followed by the foundations of universities in Dorpat (1802), Vilna (1802), Kazan (1804), Kharkov (1804) and St.Petersburg (1819) by Alexander I.[11] It is interesting to note that “the founding dates of professional societies such as the Russian Physical-Chemical Society [1869] were comparable to the birth dates of similar societies in the United States.”[12] The professional societies specialised in mathematical sciences that are established at the Imperial period of Russia were the Society of Mathematicians (1811), the Moscow Mathematical Society (1864), the Kharkov Mathematical Society (1879), The Kazan Mathematical Society (1890). the Physics and Mathematics Society of Kiev University (1890), and the St.Petersburg Mathematical Society (1890).[13]
Even though St.Petersburg remained as the centre for mathematical research; by the end of the nineteenth century, Moscow University became an important institution attractive for many scholars.
2.2. A Marxist revolutionBefore 1917 Russian science lagged behind the leading countries of the West, but it had achieved an inertia of its own. Even in the repressive period of Ivan Delianov's ministry of education from 1882 to 1897, mathematics in Russia continued to flourish. Russian scholars like Lobachevskii, Chebyshev and Markov occupied solid positions in the history of mathematics.[14]

“While most scientists, engineers and physicians in the Russian Empire greeted the February Revolution as an event that held much promise for political freedom and scientific research, their reaction to the advent of the Bolsheviks in October was one of suspicion and hostility.”[15]

The technical intelligentsia felt that its social status was in danger. However, Lenin “often personally received the representatives of the Academy, Vice-President V.A.Steklov and Permanent Secretary S.F.Ol'denburg, and talked with them about the work and needs of the Academy.”[16] And with the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1921, which was a strategical step backwards from the socialist ideals, the psychological distance between the technical intelligentsia and the Socialist State diminished.
On one hand, no member of the Academy of Sciences was a member of the Communist Party for many years[17]; but on the other, “the number of scientific workers in institutes of the Academy grew from 154 in 1917 to 413 in 1925.”[18]
2.3. The Soviet Union
In the Stalinist period, the attitude of the Socialist State towards technical intelligentsia changed dramatically. The Cultural Revolution, and the “Great Break” in general, in 1928-31, created a repressive atmosphere for independent research. While these actions are mainly explained with Stalin's personality and ideological stance; it is important to note that they were the realisation of the reconstruction of Soviet state as a proletarian state that was considered, by revolutionary groups, to be delayed. During the Stalinist period, the Soviet Union created a new generation of technical intelligentsia that is said to accord with the socialistic ideals.
After Stalin, periods of repression followed by periods of liberalisation constituted a fluctuating environment for the scientists. Unfortunately, this period of Soviet history will not be included in this essay.[19]

3. Politicisation of Mathematics
History of mathematics is full of stories where ideologies heavily affect the activities of the mathematicians. Historically, the first well-known example is the story of Hippasus of Metapontum, who is said to be drowned by Pythagoras since he proved, contrary to the belief of Pythagoreans that all numbers can be expressed as a ratio of two natural numbers, the irrationality of the square root of 2.
While the examples that come into the mind are merely stories of mathematicians influenced by the political environment they work in, the Soviet Union is the unique example where the mathematical activities themselves are considered as political.
3.1. A Political Environment
Scientific research in the Soviet Union was under a threat of being labelled as 'bourgeois science' and hence 'against the ideology of the victorious revolution'.:

“When some Soviet intellectuals tried to discuss Freud and the development of psychoanalysis, the critics answered by connecting Freud's views to the bourgeois culture of middle Europe, with its guilt-ridden neurosis. ... When some economists raised doubts about the ability of the Soviet Union to achieve unheard-of industrial growth rates in face of limited resources, radical economists accused them of trying to slow the development of the socialist state. ... When certain Soviet authors tried to interpret the meaning of the new developments in relativity and quantum physics, showing that the old concepts of materialism and causality were no longer adequate, the Soviet critics often replied that bourgeois intellectuals were engaged in a reactionary effort to discredit scientific materialism.”[20]

Soviet intellectuals were always on the alert due to concerns that their activities, both in content and in presentation, should accord with the ideology of the Socialist State.
3.1.1. N.N.Luzin’s Case
An interesting case is the affair of Nikolai Nikolaevich Luzin (1883-1950), the worldwide known mathematician who founded the Moscow school of theory of functions. In 1936, Luzin was the chairman of the presidium of the Mathematical Group of the Department of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, the head of the Mathematical Certification Commission, and the head of a department at the academy's Mathematical Institute.[21] “He was a philosopher with a non-Marxist orientation. He was a religious believer who did not accept the new regime.”[22] But also, “in his public life, Luzin was a conformist.”[23] So, even though he was never openly attacked in Soviet mass media, he had more than what one needs to be attacked.
In July and August 1936, in several unsigned articles published in the leading newspaper Pravda, he was accused of “blatant plagiarism, openly biased reviewing of mathematical texts, overpraising of obviously weak works” and “publishing his best manuscripts abroad.”[24] Luzin admitted his misbehaviour, but was dismissed from his administrative positions mentioned above. On August 6th, an editorial was issued in Pravda, declaring that the “Soviet scientific youth” had “finally gained control over higher mathematics” and “assisted in demasking the class enemy;”[25]concluding the campaign against Luzin. “In 1941, he was given back his former office at the Mathematical Institute, and two years later he returned to the university.”[26]
The operation against Luzin was a part of the ideological shift process away from internationalism towards a rhetorically masked nationalism.[27] This can be seen in the following passage from one of the articles against Luzin:

“Perhaps they do not possess a feeling of national pride in even the tiniest dose? ... Perhaps, they do not experience Soviet patriotism at all? ... Such a situation must not be tolerated any further. The Soviet Union is not Mexico or some kind of Uruguay, it is a great socialist power.”[28]

This ideological shift can be said to start in February 1934 and end in March 1939.[29] Thus, 'the Luzin affair' was just a step in this campaign.[30]
N.N.Luzin's case is a clear illustration of the influence of political state of affairs in the Soviet Union on academicians.
3.2. A Political Profession
“One of the remarkable aspects of the Russian Revolution was that it presented not only a prescription for a different political and economic order but also an alternative form of knowledge of the natural world; it called for a Marxist interpretation of nature consciously opposed to existing “bourgeois” descriptions. No other revolution in history contained a radical epistemological and cognitive system to the same degree.”[31]

In the following, three examples of this approach will be given. First, a discussion on what probability theory should be will be mentioned. Secondly, A.D.Aleksandrov's opinions on mathematics will be summarised. Lastly, an approach to the history of science that is initiated by Boris Hessen, namely 'externalism', which complements historical materialist approach in that discipline, will be discussed.
3.2.1. Politically Correct Probability
The intellectual attacks towards the use of probability theory and statistics to demonstrate that religion was supported by mathematical arguments were made mainly by Ernst Kolman (1892-1979) and Mikhail Khrisanovich Orlov (1897-1944). Below is an attack made by Orlov to the pre-Revolutionary Nekrasovites, i.e. the Moscow Mathematical School, as opposed to the St.Petersburg School lead by A.A.Markov (1856-1922), an atheist and a volatile fighter for scientific purity and for justice who was much acceptable to the incoming regime.[32]
The reader should first recall Bayes' theorem:
If A1, A2, ... ,An is a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events, and B is any event; then
P(AiB) = P(BAi) P(Ai) / ∑ j P(BAj) P(Aj)
V.Y.Buniakovsky used Bayes' formula “in the context of the testimony of witnesses affecting the probabilities of unlikely events in the remote past, and thus using probability mathematics in support of religion.”[33] Suppose A1 is an unlikely event (perhaps a miracle in remote past) with very small probability ε>0 and A2 is the complementary of that event. Now suppose that B is the event that m witnesses testify that the event has occurred, and each witness, independent of what others say, tells the truth by a probability 1-δ. Then Bayes' theorem gives that if (1-δ)>1/2, then P(A1B) approaches 1 as m becomes large, and the approach is rapid.[34]
Orlov cites Nekrasov's praising Buniakovsky and states:

“Religion is now an inseparable part of the bourgeois apparatus for the repression of the masses ... Amongst other sciences, mathematics is also used by “representatives of the enlightened bourgeoisie” to strengthen their ideological positions ... This is why the exposure of such arch-reactionary attempts is of great importance in the general battle of the proletariat against capitalism.”[35]

He then concludes that “in his 'Bible' ... Nekrasov [speaks] of posterior probabilities, but no mathematical manipulations give the least occasion to speak of 'god' on the basis of Bayes' Theorem”[36] This discussion is an interesting example of the use of mathematics to support an ideological stance and the reactions to such an attempt.
3.2.2. Mathematics and Dialectics
Aleksandr Danilovich Aleksandrov (1912-1999), a distinguished mathematician educated in the Revolution's most idealistic period, was a sincere Marxist. He was the rector of Leningrad University from 1952 to 1964. Below is an analysis of an article he wrote on mathematics and dialectics due to the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Lenin.
He cites Bertrand Russell's assertion that “mathematics is that doctrine in which we do not know whereof we speak nor whether what we say is true” and proposes that “mathematics creates its apparatus and it is absurd to speak of what is true and false: the apparatus either works or it does not, and if it works it either works productively or poorly.”[37]
He emphasises that “the value and validity of mathematics consists in its applications”, not forgetting to remark that “exclusive preoccupation with certain applications is similar to the working of a machine only as a cutter or of industry only in production of objects of consumption.”[38]
Aleksandrov considers the development of mathematics as a dialectical progress of the unity of opposites and notes that

“the development of mathematics is not confined to the establishment of new theorems, the invention of new methods and definitions of concepts in an arena already formulated. It includes also the development of essentially new concepts, the incorporation of new objects, and the establishment of fundamentally new theories.”[39]

His opinions on mathematics are interesting because of two reasons: First, even though the Soviet State was generally considered to be unsuccessful in creating its own socialist intelligentsia, Aleksandrov was a prominent academician to have international academical recognition and strong ties with Marxism at the same time. Secondly, the consistency and compatibility of his ideas with Kolmogorov's definition of mathematics in BSE are striking.
3.2.3. Boris Hessen and History of ScienceIt is of great importance to mention Boris Hessen (1893-1936) and his approach to the history of science in this essay, because the story of Hessen and the Second International Congress of the History of Science in 1931 is an astonishing example to display almost all the features of the Soviet science mentioned in this essay: the relationship between science and the political economical context, the discussions about what science should be, and the highly political environment in which academicians work.[40]
In the 1931 Congress, Hessen presented a report on Isaac Newton. “Most previous treatments of Newton had depicted him as a genius whose creativity transcended human understanding,”[41] but Hessen announced that Newton and his work “could not be understood outside the context of the rise of mercantile capitalism in England.”[42] He asserted that the new technologies the industrial revolution demanded for could only be obtained by applying his three laws of physics to ballistics, mechanics and hydrostatics. Studying Newton's personal life and his philosophical ideas, Hessen maintained that “Newton was the typical representative of the rising bourgeoisie, and in his philosophy he embodies the characteristic features of his class.”[43] Thus, he formulated 'externalism' in the historiography of science, a discipline that stresses social, economic, and other non-scientific influences on the development of science.
However, there was an underlying argument in Hessen's paper. To see it, one should note that he was a defender of the compatibility of modern physical theories like relativity and quantum mechanics, and Marxism. Einstein's controversial ideas about how to interpret the results obtained from modern physics were heavily criticised by Soviet ideologists on the grounds that he related the results with the existence of some sort of a divine power. But Hessen argued that Einstein's personal philosophical stance can be separated from the validity of these scientific accomplishments. For that purpose, he demonstrated the parallel situation in Newton's case, where there was complete consensus about the validity. Hence, Hessen's report was a part of the ongoing discussions in the Soviet Union about which scientific theories are 'politically correct'.
Hessen's stance was strongly criticised by E.Kol'man.[44] Kol'man tried to show how the wreckers in physics were trying to discredit materialism[45]:

“The wreckers do not dare to say directly that they want to restore capitalism, they have to hide behind a convenient mask. And there is no more impenetrable mask to hide behind than a curtain of mathematical abstraction.”[46]

Even though Hessen's ideas on the history of science were internationally accepted in the course of time, in a personal sense, he failed in the debate. “He died in prison in 1938, a victim of the purges, along with six members of the eight-man delegation to London in 1931.”[47]

4. A Historical Materialist Analysis of the Development of Historical Materialist Mathematics in the Soviet Union
The examples mentioned in Section 3 show, besides from other interesting features of the Soviet science, how important the attitude of the Socialist state was for scientific studies. In this section, the evolution of the attitude of the state in the Soviet Union will be discussed.
4.1. Different Attitudes towards the Technical Intelligentsia
As mentioned in Section 1, the modernisation of Russia started during the reign of Peter the Great. His method was criticised due to the fact that he attempted to bring science and technology from the Western Europe to Russia by starting from the top, with an academy of sciences.[48] Peter replied to these critics:

“I have to harvest large shock of grain, but I have no mill; and there is not enough water close by to build a water mill; but there is water enough at a distance; only I shall have no time to make a canal, for the length of my life is uncertain, and therefore I am building the mill first and have only given orders for the canal to be begun, which will force my successors to bring water to the completed mill.”[49]

Considering the accomplishments of the Academy in the following century, it can be said that Peter correctly anticipated the development of science in Russia.
After the October Revolution, “when the Communist leaders inherited this extraordinary institution, they faced a decision -abolish it, as in the French Revolution; support it at the existing level while expanding research in other institutions such as the universities; or build a structure of scientific research in which it would be the central and critical element. They decided to adopt the last choice”[50] due to the economic crisis and famine, and hence the need for technical advice in these matters. There was strong insistence by the radical revolutionaries, asserting that bourgeois intellectuals must be replaced by socialist scientists in order to obtain a purely proletarian science. Nevertheless, Lenin's opinion on the subject was somewhat different: “We must take all of culture which capitalism left to us and build socialism out of it. We must take all science, technology, all knowledge, art. Without them we cannot construct the life of a communist society. And science, technology and art are in the hands and heads of the specialists.”[51] Thus, Lenin defended the 'transformation' of the technical intelligentsia.
However, the 'reconstruction' of it was realised in the Stalinist period. The 'Great Break' separated the sheep from the goat by eliminating the options into two: to support the Socialist State by heart, or to be an enemy of socialistic ideals. The Luzin Affair, the debates on probability theory, and the case of Boris Hessen are examples of this period. In an interview in 1934, Stalin voiced his opinion on how the engineers should work. He pointed out that “the engineer, the organizer of production, does not work as he would like to, but as he is ordered. ... It must not be thought that the technical intelligentsia can play an independent role.”[52] Stalinist period marks a paranoid horror created amongst scientists.
The development of science cannot be separated from these attitudes of these leaders.
4.2. Soviet Mathematics and its DevelopmentThe number of articles published on mathematics increased from 40 in 1917 to 302 in 1929. At the same time, the number of authors who published these articles increased from 24 to 136. Also, the number of articles on mathematics published abroad rose from 13 to 102.[53] In 1967, about a quarter of all scientific publications in the realm of mathematics consisted of works from the USSR.[54] And “by the early 1980s, the Soviet Union had 10 to 30 percent more scientists and engineers than the United States, depending on the definition of degrees and fields.”[55]
There are several reasons for this remarkable development. Three of them will be mentioned below.
First, it must be admitted that, whatever the political repression and manipulation there were, financial support for academical works from the state never stopped in the Soviet Union. Even in the periods of economic crisis, Communist leaders gave emphasis on supporting science and technology.
Second is the so-called 'blackboard rule', meaning that the Soviet scientists could be expected to excel on those topics where world-rank work could be done with tools no more complicated than blackboards and chalk. Although Soviet science flourished in those areas where central governing is essential (such as space research), blackboard rule had considerable accuracy.[56]
Thirdly, for a student in the Soviet Union who is talented in mathematics, it was relatively easy to work independently in mathematics rather than in engineering and in most of the natural sciences, because those subject were too close to social and political issues.
Hence, there were good reasons for the development of mathematical sciences in the Soviet Union.

5. Conclusion
To summarise, mathematics in the Soviet Union was a highly political activity, both in the sense that the academicians were considered as a part of the political composition and that mathematics itself was considered a political discipline which has strong ties with the material life.
But is this approach to mathematics; namely, to consider it as a political concept; exclusive for Soviet intellectuals, or is it a general rule? Are today's mathematicians are immune to the political conditions they live in? If it is true that the history of mathematical sciences is an organic part of the development of humanity, can we say that we have a comprehensive understanding of studies in mathematics that are presently being done in the universities?
This essay was aimed at showing that today, there is a need of a thorough analysis of mathematics, which covers not only the internal discussions in mathematics but also the political economical context these discussions are made.

[1] It must be noted that the society and the academies today are two different agencies that exclude each other, which in itself provides evidence to the professionalisation and specialisation mentioned.
[2] Graham, Loren R.; Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History; Cambridge University Press; London, 1993; p.296
[3] Ibid., p.118
[4] In the comparison between EB and BSE, I heavily rely on Chapter 5: The role of dialectical materialism: The authentic phase in Graham, Loren R.; Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History; Cambridge University Press; London, 1993
[5] Graham, Loren R.; Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History; Cambridge University Press; London, 1993; p.118-119
[6] Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, vol.38; Moscow, 1938; col. 359. Quoted from ibid. p.118
[7] Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, vol.26; Moscow, 1954; p.464. Quoted from ibid. p.118
[8] Ramsey, F.P.; ”Mathematics, Foundations of,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol.15; 1941; p.83. Quoted from ibid., p.119
[9] Ibid.
[10] Whitehead, A.N.; ”Mathematics, Nature of,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol.15; 1941; p.87-88. Quoted from ibid., p.119
[11] Grattan-Guiness,I. and Cooke,Roger; ”Russia and the Soviet Union” in Companion Encyclopaedia of the History and Philosophy of the Mathematical Sciences; Routledge, London, 1994; pp.1477-1483
[12] Graham, Loren R.; Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History; Cambridge University Press; London, 1993; p.80
[13] Lapko,A.F. And Lyusternik,L.A.; From the history of Soviet mathematics; Russian Mathematical Surveys, 22(6):11-136; 1967. p.15
[14] Graham, Loren R.; Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History; Cambridge University Press; London, 1993; p.80
[15] Ibid., p.82
[16] Lapko,A.F. And Lyusternik,L.A.; From the history of Soviet mathematics; Russian Mathematical Surveys, 22(6):11-136; 1967. p.21
[17] Graham, Loren R.; Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History; Cambridge University Press; London, 1993; p.82
[18] Lapko,A.F. And Lyusternik,L.A.; From the history of Soviet mathematics; Russian Mathematical Surveys, 22(6):11-136; 1967. p.22
[19] For more information on this period: Loren R.Graham, Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union; Knopf, New York, 1972
[20] Graham, Loren R.; Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History; Cambridge University Press; London, 1993; p.92
[21] Levin, Aleksey E.; Anatomy of a Public Campaign:”Academician Luzin's Case” in Soviet Political History; Slavic Review, Vol.49 No.1 (Spring 1990), pp90-103. p.91
[22] Demidov, Sergei S. and Ford, Charles E.; N.N.Luzin and the affair of the ”National Fascist Center” in Joseph W.Dauben, Menso Folkerts, Eberhard Knobloch, and Hans Wussing, editors; History of Mathematics. States of the Art. Flores quadrivii – Studies in Honor of Christoph J.Scriba. Academic Press, San Diego etc., 1996; pp137-148. p.138
[23] Levin, Aleksey E.; Anatomy of a Public Campaign:”Academician Luzin's Case” in Soviet Political History; Slavic Review, Vol.49 No.1 (Spring 1990), pp90-103. p.91
[24] Ibid., p.92
[25] Pravda, 6 August 1936, p.3 ; quoted from ibid. p.94-95
[26] Levin, Aleksey E.; Anatomy of a Public Campaign:”Academician Luzin's Case” in Soviet Political History; Slavic Review, Vol.49 No.1 (Spring 1990), pp90-103. p.95
[27] Ibid., p.101
[28] Pravda, 9 July 1936, p.3 quoted from ibid. p.93
[29] Levin, Aleksey E.; Anatomy of a Public Campaign:”Academician Luzin's Case” in Soviet Political History; Slavic Review, Vol.49 No.1 (Spring 1990), pp90-103. p.103
[30] For another such case, see: Demidov, Sergei S. and Ford, Charles E.; N.N.Luzin and the affair of the ”National Fascist Center” in Joseph W.Dauben, Menso Folkerts, Eberhard Knobloch, and Hans Wussing, editors; History of Mathematics. States of the Art. Flores quadrivii – Studies in Honor of Christoph J.Scriba. Academic Press, San Diego etc., 1996; pp137-148
[31] Graham, Loren R.; Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History; Cambridge University Press; London, 1993; p.99
[32] In the following, I heavily rely on: Seneta, Eugene; Mathematics, religion, and Marxism in the Soviet Union in the 1930s; Historia Mathematica 31 (2004) pp.337-367
[33] Seneta, Eugene; Mathematics, religion, and Marxism in the Soviet Union in the 1930s; Historia Mathematica 31 (2004) pp.337-367 ; p.352
[34] Ibid., p.352-353
[35] Orlov, M.; Matematyka i Religiia [Mathematics and Religion]; Proletar, Partvydav; section 1. quoted from ibid. p.351
[36] Ibid., section 11.
[37] Aleksandrov,A.D.; On the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of V.I.Lenin: Mathematics and dialectics; Siberian Mathematical Journal, 11(2), pp185-197, March 1970; p.189
[38] Ibid., p.189-190
[39] Ibid., p.186
[40] In the following, I heavily rely on Chapter 7: Soviet attitudes toward the social and historical study of science in Graham, Loren R.; Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History; Cambridge University Press; London, 1993
[41] Graham, Loren R.; Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History; Cambridge University Press; London, 1993; p.144
[42] Ibid., p.145
[43] Bukharin et.al.; Science at the Cross Roads; p.182; quoted from ibid. p.145
[44] It is interesting to note that E. Kolman was the major actor in all the cases mentioned in this essay. He is said to be the author of the unsigned articles against Luzin (cf. 3.1.1.). He was also part of the discussions on probability theory. (cf. 3.2.1.)
[45] Graham, Loren R.; Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History; Cambridge University Press; London, 1993; p.148
[46] Kol'man, E.: Vreditel'stvo v nauke: Bol'shevik, 2 (1931), p76 ; quoted from ibid. p.148
[47] Graham, Loren R.; Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History; Cambridge University Press; London, 1993; p.151
[48] Ibid., p.31
[49] Quoted from ibid. p.31
[50] Ibid., p.81
[51] Quoted from ibid., p.271
[52] Quoted from ibid., p.162
[53] Lapko,A.F. And Lyusternik,L.A.; From the history of Soviet mathematics; Russian Mathematical Surveys, 22(6):11-136; 1967. p.133
[54] Fifty Years of Soviet Mathematics; Russian Mathematical Surveys, editorial, p.2
[55] Graham, Loren R.; Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History; Cambridge University Press; London, 1993; p.261
[56] Ibid., p.207

Plato's Confusions , Platonic Solids

ENERJİ VERİMLİLİĞİ
Plato's Confusions, Platonic Solids
In this report, I will try to provide an argument for Plato's approach to philosophy, where my main assertion will be that all Platonistic philosophies on the reality hidden behind the appearence are ultimately begging the question. I will try to support this assertion by several evidence from his book Timaeus, and I will mainly focus on his approach to mathematics.
Timaeus, as all other texts of Plato, is hard to read and almost impossible to understand at the first time. This is usually the case about Plato's texts, and Plato's philosophy in general, that they are difficult to follow by a critical mind of today. What he does is to presume weird assumptions, and then by use of valid argumentation and beautiful explanations, draw even weirder conclusions.
An explanation, by its very definition, must be convincing; but in Plato's case, to be able to follow the explanation, the reader has to be convinced already. So, if we read the text without asking any 'why?' questions and accept them true, then and only then are we able to acknowledge the plausibility of his logic. Plato himself once admits it: “I must endeavour to explain to you in an exposition of an unusual type; yet, inasmuch as you have some acquaintance with the technical method which I must necessarily employ in my exposition, you will follow me.”(Tim.53c) Here, of course, he means that the listeners are already studying in his Academy and are accustomed to his methods of thinking.
This kind of an argumentation is essential for idealism; because idealism in itself cannot be comprehended by human beings. It is the clearest expression of the egocentric ideology, and this part I will try to demonstrate during this report.
To begin with, I would like to give a brief summary of Timaeus. First of all, Plato's God is not a Creator in the sense that he creates everything from nothing. Instead, he “only imposes order and system on pre-existing Chaos.”1 Hence, “he brought order from disorder, deeming that the former state is in all ways better than the latter.”(Tim.30a) After that, Plato's argument goes as the following: Everything that exists has a bodily form, i.e. it is visible and tangible. To be visible, it must contain fire, and to be tangible, it must be solid, implying the existence of earth. For both fire and earth to exist, we need a third element to conjoin them.(Tim.31bc) But three objects define a surface and the body of All is solid. Therefore, we need a fourth object and we have the equations air:water = fire:air and water:earth = air:water (Tim.32b). This is indeed a mathematical explanation of the four elements theory of Empedocle, but has no mathematical meaning though. It seems totally impossible to understand what these equations really mean. Then, Plato explains why the universe has the shape of a sphere (Tim.33b). But suddenly, he begins to explain why the universe has no need for eyes, ears, mouth, hands, legs and feets (Tim.33cd). It is in fact typical for a person to give more and more explanations when he/she himself/herself sees that his/her words are not convincing. Indeed, Plato becomes less and less convincing with his exuberancy. Next, having these four elements, “God began by first marking them out into shapes by means of forms and numbers”(Tim53d). Here, Plato introduces the five regular polyhedra, today often referred as Platonic solids. Afterwards, he assigns a solid to each element. To this point, that Plato's God obeys to a certain reasoning, I shall return later. Tim.57c onwards, Plato shortly explains why there are infinitely many kinds of physical objects and discusses sense perception, human (actually, man) physiology and how other animals and women are created from men; demonstrating why Aristotle, being his student, studied Physics and tried to really understand natural phenomena, as Plato's descriptions hardly make any sense.
However, Plato is historically the first philosopher to “attempt to describe natural phenomena by mathematical means and not by mythological means.”2 Mathematical objects, being the objects of Reason and not of physical world, are suitable to his Ideas or Forms. Plato, following Parmenides' distinction between the Way of Truth and the Way of Opinion, distinguishes between the Being and the Becoming (Tim.28a). “Being is changeless, eternal, self-existent, apprehensible by thought only; Becoming is the opposite – ever-changing, never truly existent, and the object of irrational sensation.”3 By these properties, mathematics fits to Being; since a triangle itself cannot essentially be drawn on a piece of paper, but is more an object of abstraction of all the triangles drawn. Hence, Plato elegantly gives a mathematical description to natural phenomena. Moreover, in his “Academy, with the motto “Let no man ignorant of geometry enter” inscribed over its gate”4,geometry was a major subject in higher education.
Before entering a discussion on why Plato's idealism fails to explain natural phenomena, I would like to provide a few evidence on Plato's egocentricism and the reflection of it in his philosophy. First, I would like to recall the Allegory of the Cave in Plato's The Republic. In the allegory, Plato obviously refers to himself as the one who is able to see the reality, and not to someone else; and his justification is valid only when other people believe in the story beforehand. The Republic goes on defining philosopher kings, where we identify that Plato again means himself. He possesses the truth, he doesn't have to justify the truth of his assertions; and he invites us -though sadly, knowing that not every one is able to see the reality behind appearence- to his philosophy without offering any evidence of its truth, neither physical nor metaphysical.
Secondly, Plato is never interested in things which everyone can understand. Therefore, things that can be understood by everyone are, according to Plato, not worth studying; they are not true, not real. And hence his conclusion: “The physical world is an imperfect realisation of the ideal world and is subject also to decay. Hence the ideal world alone is worth of study.”5 Also, as we anticipated: “Only through strenuous, properly trained reasoning can the human mind discover Forms behind their ephemeral and shadowy images presented by the senses.”6 That's one of the reasons why he “disdained applied mathematics and protested the use of moving mechanical instruments in geometry.”7 Contrary to his teacher Socrates -who was known as teaching mathematics to a slave-, Plato's philosophy is not for the average person; because Plato feels a superiority in himself, to which point I will give more evidence later. But before that, I must, in this context, return to the story of the creation of the universe. Recalling the remark that even God follows a certain reasoning while creating the universe, we must definitely notice that God follows Plato's reasoning. So, Plato is quite sure that he has the true knowledge.
Having recalled the description of the creation, I would also like to point out the dodecahedron problem, which a careful reader might have noticed. I already mentioned about God's assigning a solid to each element; now, I would like to give a more extended summary of what Plato describes. He takes two triangles, and after certain procedures that were already known in his time, he constructs four of the regular polyhedra; namely, the pyramid (tetrahedron), the octahedron, the icosahedron, and the cube. The first defect of Plato's reasoning is that the dodecahedron cannot be constructed with his triangles. Furthermore, he knows that there are five regular polyhedra, but he also assumed that there are four elements but not five. Here, Plato's ego shows himself and he finds the solution: “And seeing that there still remained one other compound figure, the fifth, God used it up for the Universe in his decoration thereof.” (Tim.55c) The searchings of the curios reader are in vain, there are no other explanations for that. Plato does not even mention dodecahedron through the text again. This is, in my opinion, the clearest case that, according to Plato, if something does not fit into his story, then his assumption is that it was already a special case for the God in the Creation.
Lastly, Plato directly humiliates people who do not approach to philosophy in his way. After the creation of men, Plato depicts how other animals are created from men: “And the tribe of birds are derived by transformation, growing feathers in place of hair, from men who are harmless but light-minded”(Tim.91d), which is followed by “And the wild species of animal that goes on foot is derived from those men who have paid no attention at all to philosophy nor studied at all the nature of the heavens, because they ceased to make use of the revolutions within the head and followed the lead of those parts of the soul which are in the breast.”(Tim.91e) Here, Plato clearly identifies the people who are not interested in things he does, as inferior to him. He continues: “On this account also their race was made four-footed and many-footed, since God set more supports under the more foolish ones, so that they might be dragged down still more to the earth.”(Tim.92a) It is not incorrect, I suppose, to interpret this statement as an insult to the people who don't philosophise in Plato's way.
Taking the above discussion into consideration, I would like to point out the similarity between Plato's explanations about the creation of the universe, and the typical “God exists because the Bible says so.” arguments. In both of them, the argument begs the question, thus convincing only those who were already convinced. Platonic Idealism, and idealism in general, is based on strange assumptions which are declared as unquestionable. This is, in fact, the main problem of idealism. Interestingly, however, “Plato had criticized the earlier philosophers for their failure to indicate the Cause of the physical processes by which they explained the World.”8
On the other hand, as Plutarch report Plato's famous “God eternally geometrizes”9, Plato was the first philosopher to see the essential connection between mathematical knowledge and natural phenomena. His emphasis on mathematics made it possible for his followers to make effort on finding the right relations between them; whereof one of the longest lasting higher education institutions of Europe, the Academy (B.C.E. 387 – C.E. 529)10, was for centuries the leading institution of mathematics in Europe.
All in all, today's natural sciences owe a lot to Plato's writings, but only in the historical sense as his works encouraged debates and studies on the subjects he discussed, and not in the philosophical sense as his texts offer no help to today's scientists and thinkers.
1Bury, R.G. ; Introduction to the Timaeus in PlatoVII ; Page T.E. , Capps E. ; Rouse W.H.D. et al ; The Loeb Classical Library ; 1952 ; page 7
2Artmann, Benno ; Euclid - The Creation of Mathematics ; Springer ; 1999 ; page 306
3Bury, R.G. ; Introduction to the Timaeus in PlatoVII ; Page T.E. , Capps E. ; Rouse W.H.D. et al ; The Loeb Classical Library ; 1952 ; page 6
4Calinger, Robert ; A Contextual History of Mathematics ; Prentice-Hall ; 1999 ; page 103
5Kline, Morris ; Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times ; Oxford University Press ; 1972 ; page 44
6Calinger, Robert ; A Contextual History of Mathematics ; Prentice-Hall ; 1999 ; page 103
7Calinger, Robert ; A Contextual History of Mathematics ; Prentice-Hall ; 1999 ; page 103
8Bury, R.G. ; Introduction to the Timaeus in PlatoVII ; Page T.E. , Capps E. ; Rouse W.H.D. et al ; The Loeb Classical Library ; 1952 ; page 5
9Kline, Morris ; Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty ; Oxford University Press ; 1980 ; page 6
10Kline, Morris ; Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times ; Oxford University Press ; 1972 ; page 42-43