Logical deconstruction of a moment

He looked at her like someone who knew what he wanted.

From her look, to him, it was not clear, to him, whether she thought that he looked at her like someone who knew what he wanted, or not, while, in the affirmative case, that is, in the case that she thought he looked at her like someone who knew what he wanted, it was not clear, to him, whether she believed that the look was for real, for, even when one looks at someone else, at her in this case, like someone who knows what he wants, it does not necessarily follow that he actually knows what he wants,

which, in turn, can occur in two cases, one of which is this, that he does not know what he wants, but pretends to know what he wants, and, the second of which is this, that he does not know what he wants, but thinks he knows what he wants. The former case, that he looked at her like someone who knows what he wants, while actually not knowing what he wants, and, furthermore, that he was aware that he did not know what he wanted, yet looked at her like someone who knows what he wants, could have been a result of pretentious self-confidence, for he was well-known for his lack of self-confidence. The latter case, that he looked at her like someone who knows what he wants, thinking that he knew what he wanted, and, therefore, supposed that he, looking at her like someone who knows what he wants, was acting in an honest way, while, in reality, he did not know what he wanted – or, for that matter, perhaps was mistaken in his understanding of what he wanted, which would yield a similar result and will therefore be omitted in this analysis – , could have been a result of a delusion or of a confusion, of him, about what he wanted. Not that there was any reason for him to believe that it was the affirmative case, that is, that she thought he looked at her like someone who knew what he wanted, for it might well have been that she did not think he looked at her like someone who knew what he wanted, or, even worse, that she thought he looked at her like someone who did not know what he wanted. The only observable information was that his impression was that he looked at her like someone who knew what he wanted, and that she looked back, at him.

However, it was important for him, how she felt, or thought. (Not that it was not important for her, how she felt, or thought, for it was probable that it was, but this case is beyond the scope of this analysis.) It was important for him, how she felt, or thought, as he, once having known how she felt, or thought, would act according to this information. This is why he studied, in a moment's duration, each of the mentioned cases, and how he should act in each of the cases, in order to determine the best action to pursue, given that he did not have the information of how she felt, or thought.

If she thought that he looked at her like someone who knew what he wanted, yet that he actually did not know what he wanted but only pretended to know what he wanted, then, provided that she tracked this observation until its logical consequences, as he did, she would conclude, as he did, that he was pretending to be self-confident, which could most probably cause her to introduce a further distance between them – as there was already a distance between them, for historical reasons –, as it is generally considered preferable to keep a distance with someone who is considered, by the person in question, pretentious, and this would make the problem almost unsolvable, except if she had a preconception of him, which implied, or was, that he pretended to be self-confident for good intentions, for reasons unknown, in which case she could consider excusing, or at least ignoring, his condition. He concluded that, in this case, except when it was the exceptional sub-case mentioned just now, he would reach a dead end. Therefore, his only hope, in this case, to continue in any positive direction, was the small probability that she had a preconception of him, which implied, or was, that he pretended to be self-confident for good intentions, for reasons unknown, and, after calculating this probability to be infinitesimal, he moved on to the other cases.

If she thought that he looked at her like someone who knew what he wanted, that he did not know what he wanted, but thought he knew what he wanted, then, provided that she tracked this observation until its logical consequences, as he did, she would conclude, as he did, that he was deluded or confused, about what he wanted, which could most probably cause her to hesitate to express her feelings, or thoughts, seeing that he was not reliable. He concluded that, in this case, he would reach a dead end, unless he could find another way, a way different than looking at her like someone who knows what he wants, to continue the conversation towards a positive direction, in which she would feel comfortable to express her feelings, or thoughts. Given that she already had grounds for hesitating to express her feelings, or thoughts, he calculated the probability of him finding another way to continue the conversation towards a direction in which she would feel comfortable to express her feelings or thoughts, in such a way to neutralize the negative effects already caused by his look and then further create a positive and motivating ambiance – seeing that he was not a conversant person – to be infinitesimal, and moved on to the next cases.

If she did not think he looked at her like someone who knew what he wanted, then, most probably, she would have to assign a meaning to his look, a meaning different from the one he intended – which effort it is not obvious she would make, but will be assumed in this analysis. He remarked that if she assigned a different meaning to his look than the one he intended, namely, to give the impression that he knew what he wanted, then it would be almost impossible, for him, to guess correctly what that meaning would be, nor what consequences this meaning would have on her attitude towards him. He concluded, therefore, that the only way out, for him, was, for him to continue the conversation in another direction, and hope to reach safer grounds, unless he could find a way to infer the meaning she assigned to his look, in order to follow her line of thought, about him, to create a positive impression on her, but this last option, of inferring the meaning she assigned to his look, seemed highly improbable to him. He calculated the probability of him continuing the conversation in a direction to reach safer grounds to be infinitesimal, and moved on to the last case.

If she thought he looked at her like someone who did not know what he wanted, which, as mentioned before, was the worst case considered, by him, in this analysis, then this would most probably imply, for her, that he, not knowing what he wanted, was not worth the conversation. He concluded that, in this case, he would reach a dead end, unless he could find another way to demonstrate, to her, that he was someone who knows what he wants. Seeing that, under the assumptions of this case, he would have failed to show her that he was someone who knows what he wants, by looking, at her, like someone who knows what he wants, he calculated the probability of him finding another, and more effective, way of demonstrating her that he knew what he wanted, to be infinitesimal.

Considering all the cases carefully, using infinitesimal calculus, and ignoring the Bayes' theorem of probability (whereby he restricted his final results to the cases where he did not reach a dead end), he decided to open a conversation, as unrelated to his look at her, like someone who knows what he wants, as possible.

This desperate attempt, as well as its consequences, are beyond the scope of this analysis. Suffice it to say here that it was not related to what he wanted.